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 Abstract 
 
Although the economic performance of migrants in the receiving country undoubtedly de-
pends on qualifications, it is also affected by inclinations. Given the probability of return mi-
gration, a behavioral link is established between the incentive of migrants to save in their 
country of destination and the prevailing wage rate in their home country. It is shown that mi-
grants coming from a low-wage country optimally save more than migrants from a high-wage 
country. Policy and research implications suggested by this savings behavior are alluded to. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There is a strong and lively interest in comparing the economic performance of migrants with 
that of native-born individuals. A widely used measure of the economic performance of a 
group of individuals is mean income. There is evidence that some time after their arrival in 
the host country, migrants outperform the native-born; other evidence suggests that the pace 
at which the economic performance of migrants improves in the host country is such that their 
economic performance increasingly approaches that of the native-born. (For a systematic and 
comprehensive review see Lalonde and Topel, 1997.) 
 
Seeking to explain the economic performance of migrants as well as the variance over time 
in this performance, researchers have concentrated on measuring and estimating migrants’ 
characteristics. Human capital attributes, the rate of appreciation of human capital, and 
changes in the composition of human capital (substituting the human capital specific to the 
country of destination for the human capital specific to the country of origin) have long been 
considered to hold the key to migrants’ performance. The empirical work suggests, however, 
that the pattern characterizing the comparative economic performance of migrants holds even 
after allowance is made for a large number of human capital controls such as educational 
qualifications. 
 
A decade ago, Galor and Stark (1990) drew attention to the possibility that migrants’ per-
formance could be attributed to the incentives they face, thereby advocating a shift in the fo-
cus of analysis from the vector of characteristics that migrants have to the structure of the in-
centives that they confront. Specifically, Galor and Stark studied the probability of return mi-
gration as an attribute that distinguishes migrants from the native born. The main contribution 
of the study was the establishment of a link between the likelihood of return migration and 
savings behavior. Given the possibility of return migration, (optimizing) migrants were shown 
to save more than did comparable (optimizing) native-born workers.1 
 
                                                 
1 Income consists of wages and the returns to savings. When the wages of migrants are held equal to the wages 
of native-born individuals, and the returns to savings are also held equal, a difference in mean incomes arises 
from a difference in the level of savings. 
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Galor and Stark’s model was extended in several directions (Galor and Stark, 1991b; 
Schaeffer, 1995) and tested (Merkle and Zimmermann, 1992; Paulson, 1999). The model was 
also used to obtain fresh insights into other aspects of the economics of labor migration 
(Mountford, 1997; Vidal, 1998). However, none of the helpful extensions and uses of the 
model have addressed the interesting issue of the difference in the economic performance of 
migrants from different countries. Virtually all the receiving countries host migrants from 
several countries, and not all migrants, grouped by country of origin, perform equally. The 
world’s leading migrant destinations attract migrants from a diverse portfolio of countries. 
For example, by 1990 France had received more than 500,000 migrants from Algeria, and the 
same number from Morocco, while the US had received more than 300,000 migrants from 
each of the following countries: China, India, Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic, as well 
as close to 1 million from the Philippines, and more than 4 million from Mexico. By 1996 
Australia had taken in more than 100,000 migrants each from China, Vietnam, and the Philip-
pines; and Canada had received more than 100,000 each from China, India, Vietnam, and the 
Philippines (OECD, 1998). There is strong evidence that “economic performance differs sig-
nificantly according to the immigrant group’s country of origin” (Borjas, 1999). Our interest 
is in finding out whether the variance in the economic performance of migrants – rendered by 
differences in migrants’ savings – can be attributed to incentives rather than to human capital 
characteristics.2 That the savings patterns of migrants to the US “are significantly different 
across country of origin” has been carefully documented by Carroll et al.(1999). Their study 
sought to explain the variation by attributing it to “cultural effects”: migrants “carry along” 
the savings culture of their country of origin, that is, migrants from countries characterized by 
high savings rates save more at destination than those from countries where the savings rates 
are low. However, Carroll et al. could not marshal empirical support for this hypothesis, con-
cluding that their findings “do not provide supporting evidence for the importance of cultural 
effects in explaining international saving rate differentials, since the savings patterns of im-
migrants do not resemble the national saving patterns for their countries of origin.” 
 
In section 2, the higher savings rate of migrants is attributed to the probability of return 
migration. In section 3, given the probability of return migration, the higher savings rate of 
migrants from country h1, compared to the savings rate of migrants from country h2, is attrib-
                                                 
2 If the consequences of migrants’ performance are of concern to the host country, as when, for example, these 
savings contribute to capital formation, the host country will obviously want to find out which migrants tend to 
save more and why. Our analysis below provides an answer. 
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uted to the wage rate in h1 being lower than the wage rate in h2. Section 2 replicates Galor and 
Stark’s model: migrants differ from the native-born in the probability of return migration. In 
section 3, migrants differ from each other in the wage rates that prevail in their countries of 
origin. Section 4 concludes. 
2. A Model 
2.1. The Macroeconomic Environment 
 
Consider a perfectly competitive world in which economic activity is extended over infinite 
discrete time. The world is characterized by an overlapping-generations model. In every pe-
riod a single consumption good is produced using perfectly durable capital, and labor in the 
production process.3 The endowment of labor is exogenously given whereas the endowment 
of capital is the resources which were not consumed in the preceding period. Capital is per-
fectly mobile across countries and the rate of return to capital is at a stationary positive level, 
r , in terms of the consumption good. 
 
Consider an economy that operates in the described world. In every time period the labor 
force in the economy is composed of natives as well as migrants (whose migration is caused 
by international wage differentials). The economy’s stock of capital equals the resources that 
were not consumed in the preceding period, in addition to net international borrowing. 
A. Production 
 
Production occurs within a period according to a constant returns to scale production function 
which is invariant across time. The output produced at time t, Yt , is  
 ( , ) ( ); / ,t t t t t t t tY F K L L f k k K L= ≡ =  (1) 
where Kt and Lt are the capital and labor employed at time t, respectively. The production 
function f(k) is strictly concave and strictly monotonic increasing. Producers operate in a per-
fectly competitive environment. The inverse demand for factors of production is therefore 
given by the first order conditions for profit maximization  
                                                 
3 Positive rates of capital depreciation could be introduced without altering the analysis. 
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 );( tt kfr ′=  (2) 
 ,)()( ttt kkfkfw ′−=  (3) 
where rt and wt are the interest rate and wage at time t, respectively, and output is the nu-
meraire. 
B. Equilibrium Prices 
 
Given the unrestricted nature of the international capital markets, the economy’s interest rate 
is exogenously given at the world level, r . Consequently, the capital-labor ratio employed in 
production is stationary at a level k ,  
 ( )1k f r−′= , (4) 
and the wage rate is stationary at a level w , 
 ( ) ( )w f k f k k′= − . (5) 
2.2. The Individuals 
 
In every time period a new generation joins the labor force. A generation consists of two 
types of homogeneous groups of individuals: migrants, m, and natives, n. Migrants as well as 
natives are identical within and across generations. Individuals live for two periods. They are 
characterized by their intertemporal utility function and by their labor endowment. The in-
tertemporal utility function is defined over first and second period consumption: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2, ,U c c u c u cδ= +  (6) 
where δ is the future discount factor. The utility function is strictly concave and satisfies the 
expected utility properties. Furthermore, .2,1,)(lim
0
=∞=′
→
icu i
ic
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Migrants differ from the native-born in a single respect. They face a positive exogenous 
probability, α , of returning to their home country in the second period of their lives and thus 
of earning a lower wage rate, wwh <<0 .4, 5 
 
In the first period of their life individuals supply their unit-endowments of labor inelasti-
cally and divide the resulting income between first period consumption and savings so as to 
maximize their intertemporal utility function. First-period consumption of individual i, ic1 , is 
therefore 
 1
i ic w s= − , (7) 
where si is the savings of individual i, i = m, n. In the second period of their life individuals 
supply their unit-endowments of labor inelastically utilizing their labor income, in addition to 
the returns to their savings, for consumption. Second-period consumption of individual 
2, , ,
ii c i m n= is therefore 
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(1 )   with probability (1 )
(1 )  with probability 
i i
i
i i
h
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w r s
α
α
⎧ + + −⎪= ⎨ + +⎪⎩
 (8) 
where α.m = α and α.n = 0. 
 
The optimal level of savings for individual i, si*, is therefore 
 [ ] [ ]{ }{ }   )1()1()1()(maxarg* iiihiii srwusrwuswus ++−++++−= ααδ . (9) 
Given the properties of the utility function, si* is uniquely determined by the first order condi-
tion: 
 { }* * *(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )  ( )i i i i ihr u w r s u w r s u w sδ α α′ ′ ′⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ + + + − + + = −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . (10) 
3. Saving patterns across migrant groups 
 
                                                 
4 For simplicity, α is taken as exogenously given, regardless of the individuals’ actions or preferences. A more 
detailed model that incorporates social and psychological pressures for return migration into the individuals’ 
preferences will not alter the qualitative nature of the results. 
5 Despite the absence of international differences in interest rates, wage rates may differ if production technolo-
gies differ across countries thereby giving rise to incentives for international labor migration (e.g. Galor and 
Stark, 1991a). 
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Suppose that migrants originate from countries that differ in their hw . 
Proposition: The lower the home country wage, the higher the level of savings. 
Proof: Using the implicit function theorem it follows from (10) that 
**
2 * 2 * *
(1 ) [ (1 ) ] 0
(1 ) [ (1 ) ] (1 ) (1 ) [ (1 ) ] ( )
mm
h
m m m
h h
r u w r sds
dw r u w r s r u w r s u w s
δα
δα δ α
′′+ + += − <′′ ′′ ′′+ + + + + − + + + − . (11) 
□ 
Corollary 1.  As a consequence of the possibility of return migration, migrants from coun-
tries with low-wage rates save more than migrants from countries with high-wage rates. 
 
Corollary 2. If return migration does not take place, the wealth of migrants from low-wage 
countries outweighs the wealth of migrants from high-wage countries. 
4. Conclusions 
 
There is a reasonable and long adhered to presumption that high-skill migrants constitute a 
superior “acquisition” because skills proxy productivity. To the extent that a migrant’s skill is 
positively correlated with the level of development of the migrant’s country of origin, and to 
the extent that the level of development of the country of origin is positively correlated with 
the wage rate at the country of origin, receiving countries will naturally prefer migrants from 
countries whose wage rates are high. Yet economic performance in the receiving country de-
pends not only on qualifications but also on inclinations; we have identified an incentive-
based reason why low wage at origin impinges positively on performance (measured by mean 
income) at destination. Related work in progress suggests that given the probability of return 
migration, a lower wage at origin is also behaviorally related to the optimal exertion of 
greater effort at destination. Thus, in formulating their migration policy, receiving countries 
may want to assign weight not only to the human capital attributes of migrant candidates but 
also to the inducements and incentives that, in a well defined manner, will impinge on their 
economic performance. 
 
The relationship between the home country’s wage and the optimal level of savings at des-
tination can also shed fresh light on the intertemporal variation in the economic performance 
of successive cohorts of migrants from a given country of origin. Much of the interesting lit-
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erature, eloquently reviewed by Lalonde and Topel (1997), on the convergence of the earn-
ings of migrants to those of the native born views the observed pattern as an artifact; the pat-
tern arises not from an upgrading of the skills of a given cohort of migrants but from a change 
in the unobserved skills of successive cohorts of migrants. Suppose that cohort 1+t  is drawn 
from a section of the home country distribution of unobserved skills that is to the left of the 
section from which cohort t  is drawn. If skills, productivity, and earnings correlate positively, 
the cohort t  migrants will outperform the cohort 1+t  migrants, giving rise to the false im-
pression that the performance of migrants improves in time spent at destination. We can now 
offer a new explanation of the observed pattern. Presumably, in time, the home country’s 
wage rises. Our model implies that the incentive facing the cohort 1+t  migrants differs from 
the incentive that the cohort t  migrants had faced, such that the optimal savings and thereby 
the mean income of the cohort 1+t  migrants will be lower than those of the cohort t  mi-
grants. The explanation of the variation in the economic performance of migrants may thus 
rest neither with skills nor with assimilation but rather with incentives.  
 
Interestingly, migration has an equalizing effect on the earnings of workers from countries 
whose wage rates differ. Because when the wage rate in 1h  is lower than the wage rate in 2h  
the earnings at destination of a migrant from 1h  are higher than the earnings at destination of 
a migrant from 2h , migration entails a wage convergence between 1h  and 2h  that, other 
things remaining the same, would not have arisen in its absence. 
 
We have implicitly assumed that both the destination country and the home country pro-
duce an identical good and that the price of the good is the same across the two countries. If 
the home country’s price is substantially lower than the destination country’s price, the sav-
ings of the migrants will presumably be affected, but not necessarily adversely. Such a price 
differential will also impact other decisions, particularly the optimal duration of stay in the 
destination country. When the purchasing power of savings (generated from work at the des-
tination country) is higher at home than at destination, the optimal duration of migration may 
well be less than the maximal feasible duration of migration. Migrants may choose to return 
home even though no reversal of the inter-country wage differential occurred. Since savings 
disposed of in the home country confer higher utility than savings for consumption at the des-
tination country, the incentive to save while at destination may be boosted rather than muted. 
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A detailed inquiry of the interaction between savings, purchasing power parity, and the opti-
mal duration of migration is provided in Stark et al. (1997). 
 
Conceivably, migrants who face a positive probability of return migration may transfer 
some of their savings as remittances to family and household members who stay behind in the 
sending country. While our model does not invite such a behavior – the returns to savings, r , 
are held the same at destination and at origin – the model is not orthogonal to remittance be-
havior either. Furthermore, remittances need not negate key results such as Corollary 2. Sup-
pose, for example, that all migrants remit and that across migrant groups remittances consti-
tute the same share of savings. Then, the savings of migrants originating from low wage 
countries that are retained at destination will still be higher than the savings of migrants origi-
nating from high wage countries. 
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